We introduce a simple primitive called Augmented Broadcast Encryption (ABE) that is sufficient for constructing broadcast encryption, traitor-tracing, and trace-and-revoke systems. These ABE-based constructions are resistant to an arbitrary number of colluders and are secure against adaptive adversaries. Furthermore, traitor tracing requires no secrets and can be done by anyone. These broadcast systems are designed for broadcasting to arbitrary sets of users. We then construct a secure ABE system for which the resulting concrete trace-and-revoke system has ciphertexts and private keys of size √ N where N is the total number of users in the system. In particular, this is the first example of a fully collusion resistant broadcast system with sub-linear size ciphertexts and private keys that is secure against adaptive adversaries. The system is publicly traceable.
INTRODUCTION
A broadcast encryption system [15] enables a broadcaster to encrypt a message for an arbitrary subset S ⊆ {1, . . . , N} of users who are listening on a broadcast channel. Any user in S can decrypt the broadcast using his private key. Moreover, even if all users outside of S collude they obtain no information about the contents of the broadcast. Such systems are said to be collusion resistant. Traitor tracing [10] is an orthogonal problem. Here a broadcaster encrypts messages so that all N users can decrypt the resulting ciphertexts. Suppose a coalition of users T ⊆ {1, . . . , N} get together and build a pirate decoder D. Then there is a tracing algorithm Trace that takes the public key PK as input and interacts with D as a black-box oracle. The algorithm outputs the identity of at least one of the users who created D. That is, ∅ = Trace D (PK) ⊆ T . Note, however, that there is no way to revoke the traitor -broadcasts can always be decrypted by all users. The tracing algorithm, as described above, needs no secrets and can be run by anyone. Such systems are said to be publicly traceable.
Trace and Revoke [25, 24] systems provide both broadcast encryption and traitor tracing. They are motivated by content protection on various platforms such as PCs, DVD players, and general content viewers. When the system is first rolled out, broadcasts are encrypted for some subset of users S ⊆ {1, . . . , N} authorized to receive them. The goal is to then revoke users when their keys are compromised. Suppose a pirate builds a pirate decoder D using the private keys of users T ⊆ {1, . . . , N}. The tracing algorithm then interacts with D and identifies one of the active keys in the pirate's possession, namely a key of user t ∈ T ∩S. We write ∅ = Trace D (PK, S) ⊆ T ∩ S. The broadcaster revokes user t by encrypting future broadcasts to the set S ← S {t}. If the pirate decoder D can still decrypt these broadcasts, we run the tracing algorithm Trace D (PK, S ) again and obtain another pirate key t ∈ T ∩S . Again, t is revoked by setting S ← S {t } and so on. Roughly speaking, the trace and revoke system is secure if this process eventually disables D without revoking any innocent party. We give precise definitions later in the paper. Note that the broadcaster can add or remove recipients from S at will.
Our Contribution. In this paper we focus on constructing public-key trace and revoke systems that are fully collusion resistant and have short ciphertexts and private keys. The system is publicly traceable in the sense that anyone can run the tracing algorithm -no additional secrets are needed. Since a party performing the tracing needs no secrets, the overall system remains secure even if this party is compromised. For message privacy we only consider chosen plaintext attacks. Rather than directly build a trace and revoke system, we instead construct a simpler primitive we call Augmented Broadcast Encryption or ABE for short. We then show that ABE implies a trace and revoke system.
An ABE contains the same algorithms as a public-key broadcast encryption system, namely (Setup ABE , Encrypt ABE , Decrypt ABE )
The encryption algorithm Encrypt ABE (S, PK, i, M), however, takes one additional parameter i. Here PK is the public key, M is a message, S is a subset of {1, . . . , N}, and i is an additional special input 1 ≤ i ≤ N +1. The encryption algorithm outputs a ciphertext that can be decrypted by any user in S ∩ {i, . . . , N}. We require that
• The output of Encrypt ABE (S, PK, N + 1, M) contains no information about M , and
• For i ∈ S the distribution generated by algorithm Encrypt ABE (S, PK, i, M) is indistinguishable from the distribution generated by Encrypt ABE (S, PK, i + 1, M) for any attacker that does not possess the secret key of user i. When i ∈ S the two distributions are indistinguishable to anyone.
We give precise definitions in the next section. We show that an ABE system directly gives a secure and fully collusion resistant broadcast encryption system. To encrypt message M to set S we run Encrypt ABE (S, PK, 1, M), namely setting i = 1. Values of i greater than 1 are only used in the proof of security and for tracing. The resulting broadcast encryption system is secure against adaptive adversaries -adversaries that choose adaptively the subset of users to attack. We then show that this broadcast system is publicly traceable (and hence is a trace and revoke system). The tracing algorithm is based on a standard tracing technique that was previously used in [3, 24, 21] and was recently made explicit in [6] . The tracing system of [6] , however, requires a secret tracing key held by a trusted party. Here, tracing requires no secrets so that there is no need for a trusted party. In summary, the two simple ABE security properties are sufficient for obtaining a trace and revoke system that is fully collusion resistant, is secure against adaptive adversaries, and is publicly traceable. We view this as the preamble leading to our main results. The main part of the paper builds a secure ABE system where the size of private keys and ciphertexts is √ N . We thus obtain a trace and revoke system with √ N size ciphertext and private keys that is fully collusion resistant and is secure against adaptive adversaries. Some previous fully collusion resistant broadcast systems [4, 7] for arbitrary sets were only secure against static adversaries and were not traceable. Building a broadcast system secure against adaptive adversaries was left as an open problem in [4] .
Related work
Broadcast encryption systems are often designed for the case when the pirate has fewer than some t private keys [15, 35, 36, 1, 37, 25, 13, 18] . Several elegant constructions [24, 12, 20, 19] , primarily designed for broadcasting to sets where a small number of users are revoked, resist arbitrary collusion, but the size of the ciphertext grows linearly with the number of revoked users. A recent system based on pairings [4] resists arbitrary collusion and has constant size ciphertext and private keys, but does not support traitor tracing. The system is only proven secure for static adversaries, namely adversaries that commit to the set they wish to attack before seeing the public key. Broadcast encryption secure against adaptive attacks was defined in [13] , but the resulting system had linear size ciphertexts when broadcasting to an arbitrary set S. The system in this paper provides adaptive security with sub-linear ciphertexts and private keys.
Similarly, traitor tracing systems are often designed for the case when the pirate has fewer than t private keys [10, 34, 32, 33, 23, 26, 3, 16, 11, 29, 2, 31, 30, 37, 21, 22] . A recent system based on pairings [6] resists arbitrary collusion and has constant size private keys and √ N size ciphertexts. That system is the basis of our tracing mechanism. Many tracing traitors systems, including [6] , assume the tracer is a trusted party and require a secret tracing key. The system in this paper is publicly traceable meaning that tracing requires no secrets. Other publicly traceable systems are provided in [27, 28, 38, 22, 9] .
Several trace and revoke systems are available [25, 17, 24, 37, 13, 14, 20, 19] that are designed for broadcasting to large sets. Table 1 summarizes the existing sub-linear size fully collusion resistant systems currently available. Here N is the total number of users in the system. As usual, all the expressions in the table should be multiplied by the security parameter.
AUGMENTED BROADCAST ENC.
Our goal is to build a fully collusion resistant trace and revoke system secure against adaptive adversaries. In particular, this gives a broadcast encryption system secure against adaptive adversaries. However, instead of directly building a trace and revoke system we build a simpler primitive we call Augmented Broadcast Encryption or ABE for short. We begin by defining what ABE is and then explain how it gives a trace and revoke system. Then in the next section we build an efficient ABE.
Augmented Broadcast Encryption: Definitions
An ABE is a public-key broadcast system comprising of the following algorithms:
Setup ABE (N, λ) A probabilistic algorithm that takes as input N , the number of users in the system, and a security parameter λ. 
If j ∈ S and j ≥ i then 
adaptive attacker and public tracing Security. We define security of an ABE system using two games. The first game is a message hiding game and says that a ciphertext created using index i = N +1 is unreadable by anyone. The second game is an index hiding game and captures the intuition that a broadcast ciphertext created using index i reveals no non-trivial information about i. We will consider all these games for a fixed number of users, N . For simplicity, we define our games for security against an adversary that mounts a chosen-plaintext attack (CPA). We can easily extend them to handle chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA) by giving the adversary access to a decryption oracle for each user in the system. Game 1. The first game, called Message Hiding, says that an adversary cannot break semantic security when encrypting using index i = N + 1. The game proceeds as follows:
• Setup The challenger runs Setup ABE (N, λ) and gives the adversary PK and all secret keys {SK1, . . . , SKN }.
• Challenge The adversary outputs a set S ⊆ {1, . . . , N} and two equal length messages M0, M1. The challenger flips a coin β ∈ {0, 1} and sends
to the adversary.
• Guess The adversary returns a guess β ∈ {0, 1} of β.
We define the advantage of adversary A in winning the game
Game 2. The second game, called Index Hiding, says that an adversary cannot distinguish between an encryption to index i and one to index i + 1 without the key SKi. Additionally, it says that an adversary cannot distinguish between an encryption to index i and one to index i + 1 when i is not in the target set S even with the key SKi. The game takes as input a parameter i ∈ {1, . . . , N} which is given to both the challenger and the adversary. The game proceeds as follows:
• Setup The challenger runs Setup ABE (N, λ) and gives the adversary PK and the set of private keys SKj s.t. j = i ©
• Query The adversary outputs a bits ∈ {0, 1}. Ifs = 1 the challenger sends SKi to the adversary. Otherwise the challenger does nothing.
• Challenge The adversary gives the challenger a set S ⊆ {1, . . . , N} and a message M . The only restriction is that ifs = 1 then i ∈ S. The challenger flips a coin β ∈ {0, 1} and sends C R ← Encrypt ABE (S, PK, i+β, M) to the adversary.
We define the advantage of adversary A as the quantity
In words, the game captures two properties. The cases = 0 captures the fact that even if all users other than i collude they cannot distinguish whether i or i + 1 was used to create a ciphertext C. The cases = 1 captures the fact that when i ∈ S then even if everyone colludes they cannot distinguish whether i or i + 1 was used to create C. Indeed, when i ∈ S the key SKi gives little additional information. Now that the games are established we are ready to define secure ABE. 
Using Augmented Broadcast Encryption
We first show that a secure ABE is a broadcast encryption system secure against adaptive attackers. We then show that this system is traceable, thus obtaining a trace and revoke system. From here on, whenever we refer to an adversary we mean an adversary whose running time is polynomial in the security parameter λ.
Broadcast encryption secure against adaptive attacks
We show that EBE = (Setup ABE , Encrypt, Decrypt ABE ) is a fully collusion resistant broadcast encryption system secure against adaptive attackers.
First we need a slightly more elaborate message hiding game. In addition to N, λ, the extended message hiding game takes as input a parameter i ∈ {1, . . . , N + 1} which is only given to the challenger. The game proceeds as follows:
• Setup The challenger runs Setup ABE (N, λ) and gives the adversary PK.
• Query The adversary issues adaptive private key queries: it repeatedly sends values j ∈ {1, . . . , N} to the challenger and the challenger responds with SKj. Let S0 ⊆ {1, . . . , N} denote the entire set of private keys requested by the adversary during the query phase. Let S0 = {1, . . . , N} S0.
• Challenge The adversary outputs a set S ⊆ S0 and two equal length messages M0, M1. The challenger flips a coin β ∈ {0, 1} and sends
to the adversary. This is the only place where i is used in this game.
We define the advantage of adversary A in winning the game as MH AdvA
The main point is that MH AdvA [1] is the same quantity used to define broadcast encryption security against adaptive attackers [13, 4] for EBE. Hence, if we prove that MH AdvA [1] is negligible then EBE is a broadcast system that is fully collusion resistant and secure against adaptive adversaries. 
In other words, this A is somehow able to distinguish
for some M and S. But then A can be directly used to win the ABE index hiding game. More precisely, we show in the full version that for all adversaries A there exists an adversary B such that for all i = 1, . . . , N we have
But since E is a secure ABE we know that MH AdvA 
Trace and Revoke
A trace and revoke system is a broadcast system with a tracing algorithm. We formally define trace and revoke systems in Appendix A along with the games used to define security. We show here that a secure ABE directly gives a trace and revoke system. In particular, we show a tracing algorithm for the broadcast system EBE above. The tracing algorithm uses a general tracing method, previously used in [3, 24, 21, 6] . We use the notation from Appendix A. For a given > 0 and a set SD the tracing algorithm Trace D (SD, PK, ) works as follows.
1. Initialize set T to the empty set. Note that the running time of Trace is cubic in N . It can be made (almost) quadratic using binary search instead of a linear scan.
Let ETR = (Setup ABE , Encrypt, Decrypt ABE , Trace) be the resulting trace and revoke system. Note ETR is just the broadcast system EBE with the tracing algorithm Trace. We show that ETR is secure in the sense of Definition A.1, namely fully collusion resistant against an adaptive adversary. 
We know that p1 ≥ and pN+1 is negligible. The former follows from the fact that D is a useful decoder. The later follows directly from the ABE message hiding game. Then there must exist some j ∈ {1, . . . , N} such that pj − pj+1 ≥ /(2N ). By the Chernoff bound it follows that with overwhelming probability,pj −pj+1 ≥ /(4N ). Hence, the set T output by Trace D (SD, PK, ) is non-empty. It remains to show that wheneverpj −pj+1 > /(4N ) we have that j ∈ SD ∩U . For such j we know, by Chernoff, that with overwhelming probability pj − pj+1 ≥ /(8N ). We can now show that the ABE index hiding game implies j ∈ U and j ∈ SD. Clearly j ∈ SD since otherwise, even given all the secret keys, there is no hope of distinguishing pj from pj+1. But if j ∈ SD and j ∈ U then D must distinguish pj from pj+1 without the key SKj. Again, such a D can be directly used to win the ABE index hiding game. Hence, j ∈ SD ∩ U . We give the proof details in the full version of the paper.
BACKGROUND AND COMPLEXITY ASSUMPTIONS
Our traitor tracing system uses bilinear groups of composite order. We review the definition of such groups and then state our complexity assumptions. We follow [5] in which composite order bilinear groups were first introduced.
The assumptions we make are a little stronger than the ones in [6] . These stronger assumptions are needed to make the system publicly traceable, namely not requiring a secret tracing key. Without public traceability a direct variant of the system in this paper can be proven secure under the exact same assumptions used in [6] .
Bilinear groups of composite order. Let G be an algorithm called a group generator that takes as input a security parameter λ ∈ Z >0 and outputs a tuple (p, q, G, GT , e) where p, q are two distinct primes, G and GT are two cyclic groups of order n = pq, and e is a function e : G 2 → GT satisfying the following properties:
• (Non-degenerate) exists g ∈ G such that e(g, g) has order n in GT .
We assume that the group action in G and GT as well as the bilinear map e are all computable in polynomial time in λ. Furthermore, we assume that the description of G and GT includes a generator of G and GT respectively. To summarize, G outputs the description of a group G of order n = pq with an efficiently computable bilinear map. We will use the notation Gp, Gq to denote the respective subgroups of order p and order q of G.
Complexity assumptions
Next we review three complexity assumptions needed for proving security of our system. The first assumption is in a prime order subgroup Gp and the last two are over the composite order group G.
Decision (Modified) 3-party Diffie-Hellman Assumption.
For a given group generator G define the following distribution P (λ):
For an algorithm A, define A's advantage in solving the decision 3-party Diffie-Hellman problem for G as: The assumption is a little stronger than the corresponding assumption in [6] since we also give g 
Diffie-Hellman Subgroup Decision Assumption.
The Diffie-Hellman subgroup decision assumption states that a random element in Gq is indistinguishable from a random element in G, even when an ElGamal encryption of a Gp element is provided. More precisely, for a given group generator G define the following distribution P (λ):
For an algorithm A, define A's advantage in solving the Diffie-Hellman Subgroup Decision problem for G as: The Diffie-Hellman subgroup decision assumption is a little stronger than the subgroup decision assumption introduced in [5] and also used in [6] . In our definition the adversary is also given an ElGamal encryption of an element vp that is known to be in Gp. Furthermore, the adversary is given g pa , h pa ∈ Gq.
Bilinear Subgroup Decision Assumption. The Bilinear
Subgroup Decision (BSD) assumption states that a random order p element in GT is indistinguishable from a random element in GT when gp, gq ∈ G are given. More precisely, for a given group generator G define the following distribution P (λ):
For an algorithm A, define A's advantage in solving the bilinear subgroup decision problem for G as:
Here g is an arbitrary generator of G.
Definition 3.3. We say that G satisfies the bilinear subgroup decision assumption (BSD) if for any polynomial time algorithm A we have that BSD AdvG,A(λ) is a negligible function of λ.

AN EFFICIENT AUGMENTED BROAD-CAST ENCRYPTION SYSTEM
We construct an Augmented Broadcast Encryption (ABE) system that has ciphertexts and private keys of size O( √ N ). We begin by offering some intuition into the design and technical novelty of our scheme. An Augmented Broadcast Encryption system must have both broadcast and tracing properties. To achieve this we will use some techniques from the broadcast encryption system of [4] and the traitor tracing system of [6] .
Difficulty of Achieving Trace and Revoke
A trace and revoke system cannot be constructed by naively combining a broadcast encryption system and a tracing system. Consider the following (misguided) approach. Suppose we created both a broadcast encryption and traitor tracing system each for N users, where each user has the same index in both systems. To encrypt a message M , an algorithm splits the message randomly into two pieces M b , Mt such that M b · Mt = M and then encrypts M b under the broadcast system and Mt under the tracing system. In order to decrypt a message a single user will need to be able to decrypt under both systems. However, if two users, Alice and Bob collude to make a pirate decoder they can break this construction. They will simply use Alice's key to decrypt the ciphertext from the broadcast system and Bob's key to decrypt the ciphertext from the tracing system. The tracing algorithm will identify Bob as a traitor. However, after Bob is revoked (from the broadcast system) the decoder will still be functional and moreover will continue to identify Bob as the traitor even though he was already revoked!
Our Approach
The principle behind resisting this type of attack is construct user's private keys in such a way that they must be simultaneously used for both the broadcast and tracing portions of a trace and revoke system. We are able to construct a secure ABE system by preventing colluding users from decomposing the two systems -the two sub-systems are essentially intertwined. In order to achieve this we multiply keys of the two portions together. Additionally, unlike [4] and [6] private keys in our system are randomized for each user to prevent such attacks. The more straightforward combination of [4] and [6] results in a scheme that is insecure since a revoked user can still break the "privacy" property and prevent other colluders from being traced, although we do not show this here. A consequence of using randomized keys is that each user must have O( √ N ) size private key storage.
The other primary contribution of our scheme is that it allows for public traceability. This comes from the fact that there exists a public key algorithm for encrypting to arbitrary index. In [6] the public encryption algorithm could only be used to broadcast a message to everyone and a secret tracing key was required for encrypting to arbitrary indices. The reason behind this was that "column" ciphertexts needed to be randomized in the Gp subgroup, while kept well-formed in the Gq subgroup. The most natural way to do this is to give an element of Gp as part of the public parameters. However, giving out such an element allows an attacker to break the scheme. In our construction we construct the parameters in such a way that allows for this type of public encryption without giving out an element of Gp.
Notation
We will express our ABE system using the same two index notation as the tracing traitors system of [6] . We assume that the number of users, N in the system equals m 2 for some m. If the number of users is not a square we can add "dummy" users to pad out to the next square. We arrange the users in an m × m matrix. Each user is assigned and identified by an unique tuple (x, y) where 1 ≤ x, y ≤ m.
We must have a linear ordering of the users that we can traverse. The first user in the system will be the user at matrix position (1, 1) and from there we will order the users by traversing one row at a time. More precisely, the user at matrix position (x, y) will have the index u = (x−1)m+y in our ordering. Additionally, an encryption to position (i, j) means that a user at position (x, y) will be able to decrypt the message if either x > i or both x = i and y ≥ j. With this notation, the Index Hiding property states that:
• For j < m it is difficult to distinguish between an encryption of a message to (i, j) from (i, j + 1) without the key of user (x = i, y = j).
• For j = m it is difficult to distinguish an encryption of a message to position (i, j = m) to that of one to (i + 1, j = 1) without the key of user (i, j = m).
We emphasize that the use of pairwise notation (i, j) is purely a notational convenience for describing our system.
ABE Construction
We will assume there are N = m 2 users in the system and we will address each user will be assigned a unique pair of indexes (x, y) where 1 ≤ x, y ≤ m. A detailed description of the algorithms follows: The public key PK includes the description of the group and the following elements: 
¿
The authority creates the private key for user (x, y) by first choosing a random exponent σx,y ∈ Zn then generates it as: SKx, y = d x,y , d x,y , d1, . . . , dy−1, , dy+1, . . . , dm , which is related the broadcast encryption system. An important technical point is that since d x,y contains both pieces multiplied together, an attacker will be unable to separate these pieces out and decrypt the tracing and broadcast portions of the system separately. Thus, for a key to be useful for decrypting a ciphertext it must be both in the broadcast set of the ciphertext and have an index greater than or equal to the encrypted index.
Encrypt ABE (S, PK, (i, j), M).
The Encrypt ABE algorithm is primarily used for tracing. It encrypts a message M to the subset of receivers that are in S and that have row values greater than i or both row value equal to i and column values greater than j. The algorithm encrypts messages M ∈ GT . It first chooses random t, κ, w1, . . . , wm, s1, . . . , sm ∈ Zn b1, . . . , bj−1 ∈ Zn (ν1,1, ν1,2, ν1,3) , . . . ,
Let Sx denote the set of all values y such that the user (x, y) is in the set S. For each row x we create five ciphertext components (Rx,Rx, Tx, Ax, Bx) as follows:
For each column y the algorithm creates values (Cy,Cy) as:
if y ≥ j: Cy = H We note that for y < j the Gp subgroup will be completely random in Cy. The Tx values can be viewed as a broadcast encryption to all members of the row x that are in the sub-target set Sx. We can also see how the parameters allow for public encryption (which in turn gives public traceability) to an arbitrary index (i, j). The public parameters that are from the Gq subgroup are used for the encryption to rows greater than i. The public parameters values V,Ṽ are used to make column components that are well formed in the Gq subgroup and random in the Gp subgroup. By forming the parameters in this way we can accomplish this without giving out a group element from Gp, which would break the difficulty of subgroup hiding.
Decrypt ABE (S, (x, y) , SKx,y, C, PK). If user (x, y) ∈ S it can attempt to decrypt by first computing a temporary key
Then it computes:
Suppose that the ciphertext was encrypted to index (i, j) and that x > i then in decryption, the pairing e(K x,y , Ax) gives the value
e(g, gq)
αxsxt e(g,
The other pairings are used to divide out
gq)
sxtrxcy and get the blinding factor e(g, gq) αxsx t . If x = i and y ≥ j then decryption can be explained in a similar way except the target groups are in GT instead of the subgroup GT,q,
SECURITY
We prove security of our Augmented Broadcast Encryption system by showing that it is secure under both games defined in Section 2. The proof structure is similar to that of [6] . There are two cases where there are important differences between what we prove here and what was given in [6] . The first is to show that it is difficult to distinguish between an encryption to indices (i, j) and indices (i, j + 1) even when the attacker has key Ki,j if user (i, j) is revoked. This is shown in the proof of Lemma 5.2.
Secondly, we need to prove that the public parameters given out to allow for public encryption to arbitrary indices do not break the security of our scheme. This is reflected in our proof of Claim 5.7, which shows that deciding subgroups is still hard even if the adversary has access to our public parameters. The other portions of the proofs are conceptually similar to [6] , however, we include them for completeness.
Proof of Security for Game 1 (Message Hiding)
The argument for security of the Message Hiding game is very straightforward since an encryption to index (m + 1, 1) contains no information about the ciphertext. The simulator simply runs the actual Setup algorithm and encrypts message M β to set S and index N + 1. Since, all Bx values contain no information about the ciphertext the bit β is perfectly hidden and the adversary's advantage is 0.
Proof of Security for Game 2 (Index-Hiding)
For clarity we present our Index-Hiding proofs in a structure similar to that of [6] . We state our main theorem and prove its security from a series of claims and lemmas whose proofs are given in the full version of this paper. First we consider the case where the adversary A chooses to distinguish between an encryption to indices (i, j) and (i, j + 1) where j < m. We state the following lemma whose proof is given in the full version. In this game we build a simulator that will guess the bit s. Ifs = 0 and (i, j) ∈ S then the proof is very similar to that from the traitor tracing system of [6] . However, ifs = 1 and (i, j) / ∈ S then our simulator will need to generate the key Ki,j for the adversary and still simulate the challenge ciphertext. The proof of this case captures the security that is gained by our particular method of composing a broadcast and traitor tracing system to make an Augmented Broadcast Encryption system.
We now consider the case when the adversary A attempts to distinguish between an encryption to (i, m) and one to (i + 1, 1) for some 1 ≤ i < m. We refer to the rows with ciphertexts in the Gq subgroup as "greater than" rows and the the row with well formed ciphertexts in G as a "target" row. Additionally, when we say we "encrypt to column j" this means that we create ciphertexts for which Cy is well formed in the Gp subgroup for all y ≥ j. We state our lemma and then discuss its proof. To prove the lemma we define a sequence of hybrid experiments:
• H1: Encrypt to column m, row i is target row, i+1 is a "greater than" row.
• H2: Encrypt to column m + 1, row i is target row, i+1 is a "greater than" row.
• H3: Encrypt to column m + 1, row i is less than row, i+1 is a "greater than" row (no target row exists).
• H4: Encrypt to column 1, row i is less than row, i+1 is "greater than" row (no target row exists).
• H5: Encrypt to column 1, row i is less than row, i+1 is target row.
The following claims, whose proof is given in the full version, show that these hybrid games are indistinguishable. 
CONCLUSION
We constructed a fully collusion resistant trace and revoke system for arbitrary sets S where the size of ciphertexts and private keys is O( √ N ). The system is publicly traceable and secure against adaptive adversaries which is unusual for algebraic constructions. Instead of directly building a trace and revoke system we constructed a simpler primitive called Augmented Broadcast Encryption (ABE) with O( √ N )-size ciphertexts and private keys. We showed that ABE is sufficient for both broadcast encryption and tracing traitors. While we proved our broadcast secure under plaintext attacks, it is not difficult to modify it slightly and apply the methods of Canetti, Halevi, and Katz [8] for security against CCA attacks. We hope that future research will lead to ABEs with even shorter ciphertexts and private keys. 
APPENDIX
A. TRACE AND REVOKE SYSTEMS
A Trace and Revoke (TR) system is a broadcast encryption system with an additional tracing algorithm. We describe TR systems where encryption is public-key and tracing requires no secrets. We refer to [6] for more information on the definition of traitor tracing systems. A TR system consists of four algorithms: Setup(N, λ) A probabilistic algorithm that takes as input N , the number of users in the system, and a security parameter λ. The algorithm runs in polynomial time in λ and outputs a public key PK and private keys SK1, . . . , SKN , where SKu is for user u. If j ∈ S then Decrypt(S, j, SKj , c, PK) = M .
Encrypt(S,
PK
A.1 Security
We define security of a trace and revoke system using two natural games. The Message Hiding Game is the same as for a broadcast encryption system secure against an adaptive attacker [13, 4] . We described the game in Section 2.2.1. We let MH AdvA [1] denote the advantage of A in winning the game.
The Tracing Game ensures that the tracing algorithm successfully traces any pirate decoder, no matter how many secret keys were used to create the decoder. The adversary's goal is to build a pirate decoder D that will decrypt all ciphertexts encrypted for a certain set SD. The tracing algorithm's goal is extract from D at least one of the keys u ∈ SD that were used to construct D. The broadcaster will encrypt all future messages to the set S = SD {u}. If the decoder D can decode ciphertexts encrypted for S then we run the tracing algorithm again, this time giving it the set S , to extract another of the pirate's keys in SD. This process continues, iteratively shrinking S , until D stops functioning.
The following game ensures that this process will eventually disable D without disabling any innocent parties. The game is defined between a challenger and an adversary A (both are given N, λ and as input):
1. The challenger runs Setup(N, λ) to obtain PK and private keys SK1, . . . , SKN . It provides PK to A.
2. The adversary issues adaptive private key queries. It repeatedly sends values j ∈ {1, . . . , N} to the challenger and the challenger responds with SKj . Let U ⊆ {1, . . . , N} be the total set of keys obtained by the adversary.
3. Finally, the adversary A outputs a set SD ⊆ {1, . . . , N} and a pirate decoder D which is a probabilistic circuit that takes as input ciphertexts in C and outputs some message M .
The challenger now runs
Trace D (SD, PK, ) to obtain a set T ⊆ {1, . . . , N}.
We say that the adversary A wins the game if the following two conditions hold:
• For a randomly chosen M in the finite message space, we have that
Pr[D(Encrypt(SD, PK, M)) = M ] ≥
A pirate decoder satisfying this condition is said to be a useful decoder.
• The set T is either empty, or is not a subset of U ∩ SD.
We denote by TR AdvA the probability that adversary A wins this game.
The game above places no limit on the size of the coalition under the control of the adversary. Furthermore, the pirate decoder need not be perfect. It need only decrypt valid content with probability . Finally, note that we are modeling a stateless (resettable) pirate decoder -the decoder is just an oracle and maintains no state between activations. Non stateless decoders were studied in [21] . 
